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Abstract Producer organizations are often said to have the potential to help farmers meet the increasing
quality requirements of agricultural value chains. However, the external environment may inﬂuence produ-
cer organizations’ room for maneuver in implementing effective quality management. This article assesses
the inﬂuence of the relations between producer organizations, producers and other actors in the value chain
on the capacity of producer organizations to implement quality management. Our analysis focuses on four
Moroccan milk collection cooperatives that started using a milk analyzer with the aim of eliminating cheat-
ing by their suppliers. The cooperatives’ room for maneuver in improving quality management was limited
by the presence of competitors for milk collection and by the agro-industry’s lack of transparency in the way
its own quality controls were applied. Future studies on how producer organizations can meet the quality
challenge should include the strategies of other actors in the value chain in their analyses.
Il est souvent dit des organisations de producteurs qu’elles ont le potentiel d’aider les agriculteurs à répondre
aux exigences de qualité croissantes dans les ﬁlières agricoles. Cependant, l’environnement externe peut
inﬂuencer la marge de manoeuvre qu’ont ces organisations de producteurs pour mettre en oeuvre une gestion
efﬁcace de la qualité. Cet article évalue l’inﬂuence qu’ont les relations entre les organisations de
producteurs, les producteurs et d’autres acteurs d’une ﬁlière, sur la capacité des organisations de producteurs
à mettre en oeuvre une démarche de gestion de qualité. Notre analyse porte sur quatre coopératives
marocaines de collecte de lait qui ont commencé à utiliser un analyseur de qualité du lait en vue d’éliminer
des comportements de triche chez les agriculteurs fournissant les coopératives. La marge de manoeuvre des
coopératives pour l’amélioration de la gestion de la qualité est limitée par la présence de concurrents pour la
collecte du lait ainsi que par le manque de transparence de l’industrie agro-alimentaire dans la manière dont
elle applique ses propres contrôles de qualité. De futures études sur la manière dont les organisations de
producteurs peuvent répondre au déﬁ de la qualité devraient inclure dans leurs analyses les stratégies
d’autres acteurs de la ﬁlière.
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Introduction
Agricultural value chains in developing countries are increasingly differentiating products by
quality. Quality grades and standards are more and more frequently controlled by the private
sector and are becoming progressively more stringent (Henson and Reardon, 2005). This implies
increased interdependence between farmers and the other actors in the value chains, not only in
terms of measuring the quality of the products, but also in deﬁning the standards to be applied and
implementing a payment system based on quality. The capacity of small-scale farmers in
developing countries to join (or remain in) value chains that demand higher and higher quality is
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a topic of growing interest (Humphrey, 2006; Reardon et al, 2009). If small-scale farmers do
not succeed in improving quality, they may be excluded from the main value chains. This may
lead to a dual system, one part involving a high-value supply chain based on high-quality
requirements that farmers cannot meet, and the other a lower-value sector that survives alongside
(Dries and Swinnen, 2004; Simonovska and Nilsson, 2011). Several academic studies and policy
documents published by international institutions point to the role producer organizations can
play in helping small-scale farmers improve quality and in ﬁnding their place in these evolv-
ing value chains (Coulter et al, 1999; World Bank, 2007). Their core argument is that producer
organizations can combine coordination with their members and with the other actors in the
supply chain (Bijman and Wollni, 2009).
Most studies on producer organizations consider that the key obstacles to improving quality
are related to their governance and management capacity. Indeed, when producer organizations
collect the farmers’ products, the relation between the organizations and their members
concerning quality is complex, since farmers are both suppliers of the cooperative and owners
and decision makers. As suppliers, farmers may want the producer organization to accept all their
products irrespective of quality, and, if the organization collects and pools farmers’ products, they
may attempt to ‘free ride’ on the quality of the products they deliver. As owners and decision
makers, members may have diverging interests that can affect the capacity of the cooperative to
implement quality management. Some members may disagree with a quality-based payment
principle (Cechin et al, 2013a) or prefer to distribute the proﬁts of the organization to increase
short-term payments instead of making the collective investments (Cook, 1995) required to
improve quality. Even when the principle of a quality-based payment is accepted, members may
disagree on the price grid for different quality (Borgen, 2011). Moreover, implementing quality
management systems creates new problems including how to monitor the activities of the staff
of the producer organizations (Hviid, 2006).
Several authors analyzed the relation between producer organizations and their external
institutional environment. For instance, Bijman and Wollni (2009) and Prowse (2012) pointed to
the capacity of producer organizations to ‘level the playing ﬁeld’ in negotiations between farmers
and agro-industries. The World Bank (2007, p. 156) pointed out that public administrations often
interfere in the governance of producer organizations. However, studies of the relations between
producer organizations and their members concerning quality generally take the strategies of
the other actors in the supply chain as a given and focus on the way producer organizations can
meet the quality requirements of these actors (for example, Narrod et al, 2009). However, these
studies do not question the assumption that cooperatives, by and large, hold all the cards needed
to improve quality management, provided the administration respects their autonomy. This
corresponds to a wider trend in development studies of considering producer organizations as
a major locus of both problems related to agricultural development and solutions to these
problems (Li, 2011). Policy recommendations based on such analyses often suggest that to
improve quality in agricultural value chains involving producer organizations, support should
mainly focus on the internal management of these organizations. However, few studies have
focused on how producer organizations jointly manage their relations with farmers and with
the other actors in the value chain concerning quality management, and how these relations
inﬂuence the producer organizations’ room for maneuver in implementing quality management.
This article assesses the way the relations between producer organizations, producers and other
actors in the value chain inﬂuence the capacity of producer organizations to implement quality
management. The case study was a dairy value chain in Morocco. A large share of the milk
produced in Morocco is collected by cooperatives, which then deliver it to dairy processing
companies. Previously, these cooperatives did not have the technical equipment to measure the fat
Faysse and Simon
2 © 2014 European Association of Development Research and Training Institutes 0957-8811
European Journal of Development Research 1–16
content of the milk delivered to the cooperative by individual farmers. This led to free-rider
behavior with farmers skimming the milk before delivering it to the cooperative, resulting in lower-
quality milk in cooperative tanks and in penalties imposed by the dairy industry. Automatic milk
analyzers were recently introduced in Morocco, providing an opportunity for cooperatives to
improve quality management. We assess the quality management systems of four milk collection
cooperatives based on the use of automatic analyzers. We use the quality management reform to
analyze the inﬂuence of the relationship between cooperatives, farmers and other actors in the value
chain on the ability of milk cooperatives to improve quality management.
Links between Quality Management and Relations among Actors in the Value Chain
In the following subsection, we analyze how producer organizations take their relations with
their members into account in the design of quality management systems. In the second
subsection, we present the main ﬁndings of studies on the inﬂuence of actors in the value
chain on quality management by the farmers and by the cooperatives.
Relations between Producer Organizations and Their Members
In some cases, producer organizations involved in marketing the products of their members do
not pool the products. When these organizations are able to pay each member according to the
quality of his/her products, they are in a good position to improve the quality of the products
concerned (Kaganzi et al, 2009). However, in many cases, producer organizations – usually
cooperatives – pool their products before marketing them. In the past, most cooperatives accepted
their members’ total production, and the price they paid the farmer was not based on quality.
The increasing demand for quality means cooperatives are obliged to introduce a quality
management system, implying that products that do not meet quality standards can be refused,
and often that payment has to be based on quality criteria (Nilsson, 1998). If cooperatives do not
introduce quality management systems, they may have to deal with problems of adverse selection
and moral hazard, leading to products of lower quality being delivered to the cooperative by the
farmers (Fulton and Sanderson, 2003).
Cooperatives generally have some kind of system to judge the quality of the products
delivered by individual farmers. Such quality management systems have two sets of rules:
(i) a system of classiﬁcation and payment that deﬁnes quality, and the relation between quality
and the price paid to farmers; and (ii) rules that deﬁne how quality is measured and how quality
controls are implemented. This is the case in sugar value chains (Boland and Marsh, 2006) and in
coffee value chains (Chaddad and Boland, 2009). Producer organizations’ quality management
systems often take into account differences in the farm characteristics and/or the strategies of
their members. In India, thousands of cooperatives collect both cow milk and buffalo milk.
Buffalo milk has a much higher fat content than cow milk. Milk analyzers measure the fat content
of all the milk delivered to the cooperatives. Farmers are paid daily according to the volume and
fat content of the milk (which may be a mix of cow and buffalo milk) they delivered to the
cooperative (Bowonder et al, 2005).
To function in a sustainable way, a quality management system needs to pass a series of
tests. Here, we further elaborate the typology of technical, economic and social tests proposed
by Touzard (2010). A major technical test corresponds to whether the quality measurement
system evaluates all quality criteria that have a bearing on the prices paid to the cooperative
by downstream actors in the supply chain. Another technical test looks at whether the machines
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used to measure quality provide reliable measurements of quality and do not break down often.
The quality management system needs to pass economic tests at cooperative and farm level.
At cooperative level, the economic beneﬁts of the quality management system must be higher
than the cost of implementing quality control. The increase in sales of the product by the
cooperative thanks to improved quality must be higher than the increase in the price to be paid by
the cooperative to farmers if the cooperative sets up a payment system based on quality. At farm
level, the prices paid by the cooperative to farmers for improved quality must be higher than the
cost of obtaining a higher-quality product from the farmers (put in another way, the price paid by
the cooperative for low-quality products should be penalizing for farmers). The main social test
corresponds to whether farmers accept the legitimacy of the quality management system. The
design of a quality management system does not only depend on whether farmers believe they
will beneﬁt economically from the new system. The set of values shared by farmers forms an
often implicit convention, which provides legitimacy and deﬁnes the general orientation of the
quality management system (Touzard et al, 2001). In particular, a long-term relationship between
the cooperative and its members can be a major asset in encouraging the farmers to improve the
quality of their products (Cechin et al, 2013b). Another social test looks at whether farmers
believe that the selection of farmers who are subject to quality controls is impartial.
Producer organizations may face technical difﬁculties in measuring the quality of their
members’ products. Lack of equipment for measuring quality is a major constraint. Many milk
collection cooperatives in East Africa have measurement tools that can only measure milk density
and freshness. These cooperatives can only refuse the milk that does not meet very simple quality
requirements, and farmers are not paid based on the quality of their milk (Nyoro and Ngugi,
2007; Francesconi, 2009). When there is no equipment to measure quality, farmers can ‘free ride’
on the quality of their products. Free riding has been identiﬁed in wine production (Pennerstorfer
and Weiss, 2012), coffee production (Mahdi, 2012) and dairy production (Gorton et al, 2006).
Non-compliance with quality standards may lead to penalties that are imposed on the whole
producer organization by buyers (Narrod et al, 2009).
The purchase of equipment to measure quality can help limit free-riding behavior. In the dairy
sector in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century, cooperatives started using machines to check
milk quality, since some farmers adulterated the milk by adding water or removing fat. These
cooperatives introduced by-laws to punish cheaters and soon started paying the farmers according
to milk quality (Henriksen and Hviid, 2004). In other cases, it may be too costly to measure the
quality of the product. To circumvent the difﬁculty of undertaking detailed assessment of the
characteristics of wine grapes, French, Italian and German wine cooperatives deﬁned quality
standards that include not only the characteristics of the grape but also farming practices. The
members of these cooperatives choose which quality standards they wish to apply and are checked
accordingly (Capitello and Agnoli, 2009; Touzard, 2010; Hanf and Schweickert, 2012).
Inﬂuence of Actors in the Value Chain on Quality Management by Farmers and
Cooperatives
Here we present key results of studies that assessed the relation between farmers and agro-
industries with regard to quality. Quality assessment and payment are playing an increasingly
important role in the relation between farmers and agro-industries (Bogetoft and Olesen, 2002;
Henson et al, 2005). The agro-industries’ aim to improve quality is resulting in increasingly
‘buyer-driven’ value chains, in which agro-industries play a leading role in deﬁning and
enforcing the complex quality standards that govern their relation with farmers (Ponte and
Gibbon, 2005). When quality measurement systems become too complex, farmers often do not
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have sufﬁcient information to challenge the grading system laid down by the lead ﬁrm (Prowse,
2012). This lack of transparency may be intentional, as it could prevent farmers from checking
that they receive adequate remuneration (Bijman, 2008). When agro-industries are in a position
of monopsony (which is often the case), farmers have limited power to challenge the quality
management systems designed and implemented by agro-industries (Singh, 2002; Wu, 2006).
The capacity of producer organizations to improve quality may be affected by the presence
and strategies of actors situated ‘vertically’ (in particular agro-industries) and actors situated
‘horizontally’ (other actors buying the same products from members of the producer organiza-
tions). In the wine sector in Europe, there are many cases where farmers sell their high-quality
grapes to private buyers and their lower-quality grapes to the cooperative (Theodorakopoulou and
Iliopoulos, 2012). Failure by the cooperatives to control quality may lead to a spiral of decreasing
quality at cooperative level, since farmers who produce high-quality products may decide to
leave the cooperative and start delivering to private ﬁrms (Mather and Greenberg, 2003).
Implementing quality management is especially difﬁcult in situations where the cooperatives
need to collect large quantities of products in order to cover their operating costs. Berdegué
(2001, p. 170) reported an attempt by a milk collection cooperative to stop accepting deliveries
from farmers whose milk was of low quality. This attempt failed because the farmers were able to
deliver their milk elsewhere. If the cooperative had stopped accepting low-quality milk, it would
not have had enough milk to cover its operating costs. However, this does not necessarily imply
that cooperatives are in a weak position when they want to ensure that members deliver quality
products in the presence of competitors. At the beginning of the twentieth century, dairy
cooperatives in Ireland faced the problem of farmers skimming their milk before delivering it to
the cooperative. These cooperatives solved the problem more effectively than private creameries
because, once they had acquired the machines they needed to measure milk quality, they included
in their by-laws the requirement that farmers must deliver their entire production of unadulterated
milk to the cooperative. Farmers found cheating had to pay a ﬁne. Farmers who did not agree with
the new by-laws and wanted to leave the cooperative would lose their share of the cooperative’s
assets (Rourke, 2007).
Dairy Chains in Morocco
Moroccan dairy chains are based on the milk produced by approximately 790 000 farms and
organized in two main ways. The ﬁrst way involves milk processing in large-scale plants. The
main operator in this chain is a private company, Centrale Laitière (Central Dairy in French),
which processes 60 per cent of the milk transiting in this way. The second way involves informal
circuits, whereby milk is sold directly to consumers or processed by small-scale dairies (Sraïri,
2011). In the ﬁrst way, a few large-scale dairy farms have their own tanks and supply the dairy
industry directly, but the vast majority of dairy farmers deliver their milk to a collection center.
There are around 1000 milk collection centers in Morocco, and these handle the bulk of milk
processed by dairy ﬁrms (Sraïri, 2011). The great majority of these centers are cooperatives.
These cooperatives only collect milk but do not process it themselves.
Members of a milk collection cooperative deliver the milk to the cooperative collection center
once or twice a day. At the center, the milk is collected by an employee, who is usually the only
permanent employee paid by the cooperative. Some cooperatives use a pick-up truck to collect
milk from farmers located a long distance from their collection centers. The dairy processing
company collects the milk from the cooperatives once a day; their drivers remove a sample of
the milk in the cooperative tanks, which is later analyzed by the dairy ﬁrm. In the 1970s, the
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Moroccan administration played a key role in the development of dairy chains, but now only
intervenes in the dairy sector at the macro level and does not interfere in the relations between
cooperatives and industries.
Centrale Laitière pays milk collection cooperatives at 2-week intervals based on the quantity
and quality of the milk collected. Before 2011, Centrale Laitière paid a baseline price that was
subject to bonuses and penalties based on milk fat and protein content. In 2011, Centrale Laitière
decided to prioritize high-quality milk and started using a new classiﬁcation system for milk
quality and a related payment system that increased the gap between the prices paid for higher-
and lower-quality milk. Four classes of milk quality were deﬁned, mainly based on the absence of
antibiotics and added water, milk stability and the concentration of non-fat milk solids. Each
quality class has its own baseline price, which changes twice a year with a higher price paid
during the low-lactation period (August–January) than in the high-lactation period (February–
July). In 2012, the baseline price of the different quality classes ranged from 3 to 3.5 Moroccan
dirham (DH) per liter1 (between 33 and 38 eurocents) in the high-lactation period. Once a quality
class has been assigned to a batch of milk, the baseline price is modiﬁed by bonuses and penalties
based on fat and protein content. Milk collection cooperatives pay the same price to all farmers
irrespective of the quality of the milk delivered by each individual farmer (Sraïri et al, 2009).
There are different reasons for the variation in fat content, including the breed of cattle, the
type of cattle feed and the stage of lactation. In the present study, the members of cooperatives we
interviewed and staff from Centrale Laitière believed that skimming was the main cause of such
variation. Farmers may skim the milk by keeping it on the farm for some hours and removing the
cream before delivering the milk to the cooperative. They can sell butter made from the cream in
local markets or keep it for domestic use. Skimming is a major problem for cooperatives. In the
past, the cooperative did not have the technical equipment to measure the fat content of the milk
they received. Cooperatives only checked milk acidity and density (to make sure milk had not
been watered down). Skimming led to low-quality milk in cooperative tanks. The resulting
penalties imposed by the dairy processing companies triggered endless conﬂicts among members
of the cooperatives and destabilized the management of the cooperatives. As a solution to this
problem, some cooperatives require farmers to deliver milk twice a day. This can limit (but not
completely prevent) farmers skimming their milk.
Recently, low-cost and easy-to-use Rapid Automatic Milk Analyzers (RAMAs, Draaiyer et al,
2009) became available in Morocco. In 2010, some cooperatives purchased RAMAs on their own
initiative to check the quality of the milk supplied by their members. The ﬁrst model to be
purchased was often Ekomilk (see www.ekomilk.eu). Later, Centrale Laitière also started
promoting RAMAs and helped the cooperatives to purchase them. After testing different RAMA
models in 2011, Centrale Laitière selected the Lactoscan SA (Milktronic Ltd, 2013) for its
precision and stability. This RAMA measures the fat, water, protein and non-fat solids in
a sample of milk in approximately 50 seconds. In 2012, this model cost around 15 000 DH (about
€1360) in Morocco. In April 2012, Centrale Laitière launched a plan to promote the installation
of Lactoscan analyzers in dairy cooperatives and investor-owned milk collection centers in the
Casablanca region, as well as in the major dairy production regions of Morocco where Centrale
Laitière collects milk.
Case Studies and Data Collection
The region of Casablanca was chosen for this study because the ﬁrst RAMAs introduced
in Morocco were used in this region and in the neighboring El Jadida region. Four cooperatives
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were selected for the study and are referred to as C1, C2, C3 and C4. These cooperatives
were chosen based on the following criteria: the date of installation of the analyzer, the use of
a pick-up truck to collect milk and the presence of competitors for milk collection (Table 1).
Figure 1 shows the main actors in the supply chains based on the milk sold by farmers who were
members of one of the cooperatives in this study.
Only members of C2 had no alternative option for milk delivery, except for one small-scale
individual collector who collected very small quantities. Members of C1 could deliver to small-
scale dairies located in a town close to the cooperative. Members of C3 and C4 could sell to
individual collectors, who fetched milk from the farms in a pick-up truck. These collectors paid
roughly the same price as the two cooperatives, and most of them delivered the milk they
collected to Centrale Laitière. Members of C1, C3 and C4 generally preferred to deliver to
the cooperatives because the collectors and local dairies do not always purchase milk in
high-lactation periods.
Centrale Laitière was the only large-scale milk processing ﬁrm that collected milk in the
vicinity of C2, C3 and C4. Another dairy ﬁrm collected milk in the region of C1, with almost the
same conditions and prices as Centrale Laitière. There was no written contract between Centrale
Laitière and the four cooperatives studied here. Most cooperatives in the Casablanca region
(including the four in this study) collected milk, helped their members purchase heifers and
purchased cattle feed. All four cooperatives belonged to local federations, but these federations
negotiated only rarely with Centrale Laitière on behalf of the cooperatives.
Table 1: Main characteristics of the four milk collection cooperatives
Cooperatives C1 C2 C3 C4
Year cooperative was created 2003 2001 1977 1983
First RAMA installed 2011 2010 April 2012 April 2012
Use of a pick-up truck for milk collection No No Yes No
Number of collection centers 1 3 1 1
Number of farmers delivering milk 80 166 82 160
Quantity of milk collected during the
ﬁrst 2 weeks of April 2012 (liters)
30 000 54 300 28 500 68 200
Farmers of C2
Cooperative
C2
Centrale Laitière (Dairy processing company)
Retailers
Consumers
Small-scale
dairies
Farmers of C3 and C4 Farmers of C1
Individual
collectors
Cooperatives
C3 and C4 
Cooperative
C1
Figure 1: Main actors in the supply chains of milk sold by farmers belonging to the four cooperatives
studied here.
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All four cooperatives had been subject to penalties (ranging from €270 to €470 per 2-week
period, depending on the cooperative) for low milk quality before installing the RAMA.
Cooperatives C1 and C2 had already used their RAMA for more than 1 year at the time of the
study. The RAMA had been installed in cooperatives C3 and C4 only a month before the ﬁrst
interviews were conducted. This made it difﬁcult to obtain a stable description of quality
management, as the C3 and C4 management committees frequently changed the rules for quality
control and payment. However, it facilitated the study of the way these cooperatives designed and
modiﬁed their quality management systems.
The main ﬁeldwork was conducted from April to July 2012. Data on prices paid by Centrale
Laitière to cooperatives were collected up to October 2012, with a follow-up in May 2013.
In each of the four cooperatives, we met members of the management committee several times
(at least twice in the case of the main leader of each cooperative). Interviews with these
management committee members focused ﬁrst on the organization and governance of the
cooperative and its relations with Centrale Laitière. Next, the interviews dealt with quality
management: who had the idea of acquiring a RAMA, changes in the quality management system
after the RAMA was installed and any impacts on prices paid by Centrale Laitière. Employees
of each cooperative were interviewed about the daily implementation of quality control. Eight
farmers were interviewed in each cooperative about their milk delivery practices and their
understanding and acceptance of the cooperative’s quality management system. Observations
were also made at the collection centers during the milk reception periods. Staff from Centrale
Laitière were interviewed six times. These interviews concerned the agro-industry strategies
vis-à-vis the implementation of the RAMAs, the speciﬁc case of each of the four cooperatives
and preliminary results of the study.
Results
The New Quality Management Systems Based on the Use of Milk Analyzers
In 2011, after having obtained the agreement of the members of the cooperative during a general
assembly, the president of C1 cooperative purchased a RAMA. In their interviews, the farmers of
C1 cooperative explained that the RAMA was accepted because any farmer who opposed buying
one during the general assembly would risk being considered a cheat. The president decided on
the minimum acceptable fat content for milk. The president performed the analyses himself, one
reason being that many farmers did not trust the cooperative employee. The penalties imposed
by Centrale Laitière stopped during this period but farmers were not paid according to milk
quality. Moreover, the controls were strict and the president was very blunt, which led to tensions
among members of the cooperative. Many farmers refused to accept the validity of the results
of the RAMA analyses or argued that the method of selecting which farmers would be checked
was not fair. In the general assembly held at the end of 2011, the cooperative bank account was
shown to have an unusually large balance (80 000 DH, about €7270), thanks to bonuses paid
by Centrale Laitière for good quality. This sum was distributed among the members of the
cooperative. However, the president was severely criticized for the conﬂicts that had arisen and
stepped down. The following president’s priority was to limit conﬂict. He used the RAMA much
less frequently and preferred to have the farmers deliver milk twice a day, instead of once. At the
beginning of 2012, the RAMA broke down and was sent to Centrale Laitière for repair, but the
management committee of C1 made no effort to get it back. Penalties for low milk quality started
again after the RAMA broke down. In May 2013, the RAMA was still not in use.
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Cooperative C2 had three collection centers. The cooperative was run by its president, and
members had little control over his system of management. In 2010, the president purchased
a RAMA, and two more in 2011. The RAMAs were used to refuse milk that did not meet the
quality criteria laid down by the president regarding fat content, non-fat milk solids and proteins.
Farmers were not paid more if they delivered good-quality milk, but the members of the
cooperative did not protest. First, many farmers gave more importance to meat than dairy.
Second, farmers had very little opportunity to deliver milk elsewhere. Third, the distance between
collection centers made it difﬁcult for members to meet and collectively ask the president to
account for his actions. In May 2013, the quality management system was still being run in
a similar way.
In March 2012, the staff of Centrale Laitière held a meeting to promote the use of RAMAs
and sold a RAMA to cooperatives C3 and C4. The C3 employee was also the cooperative
treasurer. Once the RAMA was installed, checks were made of the milk delivered by farmers to
the collection center of C3 and that of farmers who delivered their milk to the pick-up truck.
The driver of the pick-up took samples of the milk he collected during his round. These samples
were later analyzed using the RAMA at the cooperative collection center. The management
committee of C3 paid for the milk based on quality, but payments changed every 2 weeks
depending on the payment received from Centrale Laitière and the cooperative’s operating costs.
In the ﬁrst two weeks of May 2012, milk whose fat content was below a minimum threshold was
refused, and three different prices were set based on fat content above this value. In May 2013,
quality management had been simpliﬁed. The RAMA was used only to check that milk met
minimum fat and protein content requirements, and was not diluted with water. On 10 days
during the 2-week period, the RAMA was used to check the milk from farmers who delivered
once a day, including that of farmers who delivered to the pick-up truck. Farmers who delivered
milk twice a day were only rarely checked, because their milk had been checked many times and
proved to be of good quality. Cooperative C3 paid the same baseline price to all its members.
However, when Centrale Laitière imposed penalties due to low quality, these were paid only by
members who delivered once a day.
The main employee of C4 was also its president. When the RAMA was installed, the president
insisted that milk should be delivered twice a day. From the outset, the management committee
of C3 deﬁned two quality classes depending on fat content and paid a different price for each
class. In May 2013, the president routinely made three surprise checks in each 2-week period,
in such a way that all farmers would be checked at least once every 2 weeks. The prices of the
two classes were calculated every 2 weeks based on the result of these checks and on the payment
received from Centrale Laitière. In cooperatives C2, C3 and C4, the Lactoscan analyzer proved
to be relatively robust. Centrale Laitière organized the maintenance of the analyzers and repaired
those that broke down.
Cooperatives’ Handling of Outward Relations
Centrale Laitière’s payment system was complex and was based on more quality criteria than
those measured by the RAMA (for example, presence of antibiotics). None of the cooperatives’
members or staff knew the values of the quality criteria that Centrale Laitière used to deﬁne the
quality class of a batch of milk. The form provided by Centrale Laitière to the cooperatives every
2 weeks reported the quality class of the milk contained in all the cooperative tanks each day
for the preceding 2 weeks, and general penalties or bonuses related to fat content for the
whole 2-week period. However, no explanation was given about the criteria that had led to
a high- or low-quality classiﬁcation in the daily assessment of milk quality.
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The cooperatives that paid their members based on milk quality were faced with a dilemma.
One option was to calculate the price to be paid to farmers for each quality class every 2 weeks,
after how much the cooperative received from Centrale Laitière was known. Cooperatives C3
and C4 originally chose this option, but it led to an unclear and unstable system of payment to
farmers. Another option was to deﬁne quality criteria and prices paid to farmers that would not
change for several months, to give farmers clear incentives to deliver milk that had not been
skimmed. However, this would cause problems if Centrale Laitière paid less than the amount that
the cooperative had expected to receive, because of low values for criteria that were not measured
with the RAMA or because of a difference between the quality measurement made by the
cooperative and that made by Centrale Laitière. A cooperative in the Casablanca region (not one
of the four studied here) chose this option and faced this very problem. One consequence of the
lack of information concerning the quality measurements made by Centrale Laitière was that the
management committees of the four cooperatives in our study did not know exactly what they
aimed to achieve with the new quality management system, beyond increasing the income
received from Centrale Laitière.
The cooperatives’ external environment led to other difﬁculties in improving quality manage-
ment. As the farmers in the four cooperatives pointed out, milk quality could be altered after
collection. For instance, truck drivers could alter the samples and the milk they collected by
adding water. This further undermined the conﬁdence the farmers had in Centrale Laitière’s
quality measurements. Members of the management committees of C3 and C4 cooperatives
complained that many of the collectors who competed with their cooperatives for milk collection
also delivered milk to Centrale Laitière. The treasurer of C3 insisted that Centrale Laitière stop
accepting milk from these collectors if it was genuinely willing to work with the cooperatives to
improve quality. However, Centrale Laitière did not acknowledge these complaints.
Cooperatives’ Handling of Inward Relations
In their relations with farmers, cooperatives C1, C3 and C4 had to design the quality management
system based on the use of the RAMA in such a way that farmers would accept it as legitimate
and fair, and consider it economically advantageous to deliver milk that had not been skimmed.
Interviewed farmers (excluding members of the management committee) generally had a similar
understanding and acceptance of the new quality management systems in each cooperative.
They understood the purpose of the RAMA and the fat value appearing on the RAMA screen.
Concerning the legitimacy of the system, members of C3 and C4 considered that the introduction
of the RAMA was indispensable since Centrale Laitière had called for improved quality.
By contrast, members of C1 considered that improving quality was an initiative of the former
president. They acknowledged that the RAMA made it possible to improve the performance
of the cooperative, but also considered that the conﬂicts it caused outweighed the advantages.
On the subject of the fairness of the system, any rules had to leave cooperative employees
ample room for maneuver in the choice of who should be checked, since the checks were
unannounced. Members’ acceptance of the fairness of the checks thus depended to a great extent
on whether they believed the cooperative employee was honest. Members of C3 and C4 held
the employees of their cooperatives in high esteem, whereas members of C1 did not trust the
employee, and this was one of the reasons why the RAMA was used much less after the departure
of the former president in 2011.
Finally, most members of C3 and C4 we interviewed were prepared to supply the cooperative
with milk that had not been skimmed if they obtained a much higher price. However, what the
farmers would gain by delivering full cream milk was not clear. First, the constantly changing
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price of milk made it difﬁcult for members of C4 to calculate how much they would gain by
delivering milk that had not been skimmed. Second, for farmers belonging to C3 and C4
cooperatives, selling butter on the market and delivering skimmed milk to the cooperative
produced about the same income as delivering full cream milk to the cooperative. The frequent
changes in the system of payment, as well as lack of support from animal science technicians,
also explained why C4 farmers made no attempt to improve milk quality by modifying their
breeding practices.
Impacts of the New Quality Management System
Figure 1 shows variations in bonuses and penalties related to fat content paid by Centrale Laitière
to cooperatives C2, C3 and C4 from January 2011 to October 2012. No data were obtained from
C1, which stopped using the RAMA at the beginning of 2012. During the study period, leaving
aside the biannual change in baseline prices, fat content was by far the most important cause
of ﬂuctuations in milk prices paid by Centrale Laitière to cooperatives. The values in Figure 2
do not necessarily correspond to the actual fat content of the milk in the cooperative tanks,
because the quality of the milk could have been altered during transport from the cooperative
to the dairy ﬁrm or because of faulty handling of the milk analyzer used by Centrale Laitière.
Despite these uncertainties, interviews with leaders of the four cooperatives and staff of Centrale
Laitière gave similar explanations for the data shown in Figure 2.
The installation of the RAMA in cooperatives C3 and C4 in March 2012 led to substantial
increases in payments from Centrale Laitière from May to July 2012. However, from July to
September 2012, these bonuses progressively decreased. The 2011–2012 winter period was dry.
From August 2012 onward, farms began to run out of fodder and the price of straw and cow feed
increased sharply. Cows were consequently fed less and the volume of milk collected by
cooperatives decreased. The management committees of C3 and C4 worried that the decrease
would make it difﬁcult to cover the operating costs of the cooperatives, such as the employees’
salaries. These committees thought they would not be able to put pressure on farmers who were
reluctant to deliver milk that had not been skimmed because they could easily sell their milk
to independent collectors. They consequently decided to apply less strict quality controls.
Cooperative C2 was able to continue to apply strict quality standards because there was less
Figure 2: Variations in bonuses and penalties related to fat content paid by Centrale Laitière to the
cooperatives.
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competition for milk collection. The reduction in milk quality in the fall of 2012 was thus less
severe in this cooperative.
The management committees of the cooperatives, the farmers and Centrale Laitière staff
assessed the impacts of the changes in the quality management operated by the cooperatives
differently. The management committees of C2, C3 and C4 considered that the use of the
RAMAs improved milk quality and increased the payment received from Centrale Laitière.
According to the president of C4, the use of the RAMA reduced penalties from 130 000 DH
in 2011 to 80 000 DH in 2012. However, the committees of C3 and C4 stated that the increase
was much lower than the promising ﬁrst results in summer 2012. Farmers who delivered to
cooperatives C1, C3 and C4 saw little advantage in the new quality management system, and
farmers who delivered to C2 saw none. According to a member of staff of Centrale Laitière, the
introduction of the RAMAs on the scale of the region of Casablanca was more successful, since,
in April 2013, 62 out of the 67 RAMAs distributed in this region were still in working order and
the use of RAMAs had enabled an increase in the average fat content of the milk collected by
Centrale Laitière in the region by 2 g/l.
Discussion
Inﬂuence of Outward Actors onWhether the New Quality Management Systems Passed the
Tests
The four cooperatives attempted to move from a situation in which farmers skimmed their milk
to obtain extra income from selling butter, meaning the milk delivered to the cooperative was of
low quality and the purchase price paid to farmers was consequently also low, to a situation in
which the farmers refrain from skimming the milk and are paid more by the cooperative for
delivering good-quality milk. This meant that the quality management systems of cooperatives
C1, C3 and C4 had to pass technical, economic and social tests. Since C2 was run like a private
business, its quality management system only needed to pass the technical and economic tests.
The social tests were important in cooperatives C1, C3 and C4, since power was well shared
between the farmers and the cooperatives (because the farmers were also decision makers
and because of the presence of competitors for milk collection). These tests were successful in the
case of C3 and C4, but unsuccessful in the case of C1. The inﬂuence of outward actors on the
results of social tests was limited. By contrast, the results of the technical and economic tests
were highly inﬂuenced by external actors. Centrale Laitière had a positive inﬂuence on
the maintenance of the RAMAs, but did not attempt to match its quality grid to the criteria the
cooperatives were able to measure with the RAMAs. With regard to the economic tests, Centrale
Laitière’s lack of transparency in its payment did not help cooperatives in their design and monitoring
of quality-based payment systems. Centrale Laitière also had an indirect negative inﬂuence since by
accepting milk from individual collectors it increased the latter’s capacity to collect milk, and
consequently weakened the capacity of the cooperatives to improve quality management.
Overall, the results of the new quality management systems were limited. Owing to their
limited success in improving milk quality, milk collection cooperatives risk were identiﬁed as
the ‘weak link’ in the dairy chain. Staff members at Centrale Laitière often mentioned that if
cooperatives were unable to deliver high-quality milk, the agro-industry would increasingly rely
on individual large-scale dairy farms. As described by Simonovska and Nilsson (2011), the risk is
that small-scale farmers and milk collection cooperatives are progressively excluded from the
formal value chains and thus obliged to sell their milk at lower prices to informal dairy chains
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whose milk processing capacities are much smaller. These limited results stand in contrast to
those of dairy cooperatives in Europe at the end of the nineteenth century. During that period,
dairy cooperatives were able to impose quality control to prevent skimming because the
cooperatives also processed the milk and made the butter themselves. They knew the beneﬁts to
be had from improving milk quality and were able to design quality-based payments accordingly
(Henriksen and Hviid, 2004). This was not the case in the dairy chain in Casablanca.
Power Asymmetry between Cooperatives and the Agro-Industry
The previous section clariﬁed how external actors inﬂuenced the capacity of cooperatives to
improve quality management, and how these actors in fact limited this capacity with respect to
almost all the tests. Cooperatives had already sent complaints about these issues, but Centrale
Laitière did not respond to their queries. As mentioned in Singh (2002), its strong power vis-à-vis
the cooperatives was mostly due to the fact that it enjoyed almost complete monopsony.
However, this hard stand reduced the farmers’ willingness to improve milk quality (Wu, 2006)
and many farmers continued to skim their milk.
There are several possible ways to support cooperatives when dealing with other actors in the
value chain. First, cooperatives could form federations, which would have a stronger position
in negotiations with the dairy processing company. These negotiations could focus on decreas-
ing the asymmetry of information concerning quality as measured by Centrale Laitière, or
on designing and monitoring an independent ‘third-party’ laboratory in charge of measuring
quality. This laboratory could be run with the support of the state administration (Hueth and
Ligon, 2003). Another more drastic option would be for the cooperatives to deliver to a different
dairy processing company. At the time of the study, a group of cooperatives in the region of
Casablanca, including one of the cooperatives in this study, had already contacted another
company operating in another region (which was actually a cooperative) to start collecting their
milk.
Conclusion
The four cooperatives studied here innovated by developing a quality management system based
on RAMAs, not as a one-off strategy with the installation of the RAMAs, but in a dynamic way,
particularly depending on the development of their relations with the other actors in the value
chain. Quality management based on the use of RAMAs involved a wide range of actors, far
beyond a simple technical procedure aimed at eliminating ‘free-riding’ behavior. Cooperatives
had to look both inward and outward to succeed in implementing their quality management
systems.
Nevertheless, the cooperatives did not succeed in completely preventing farmers from
skimming their milk. The capacity of cooperatives to implement quality management was
constrained by the complex interactions between farmers, cooperatives, competitors for milk
collection and the agro-industry.
We do not conclude that internal governance is of secondary importance. On the contrary, the
failure of collective action in C1 or the fact that the cooperative C2 was run as a private business
by its president underlines the importance of improving cooperative governance. However, our
analysis demonstrates that the external environment of a cooperative can prevent it being the key
coordinator between farmers and agricultural value chains in achieving high quality. This was
especially clear in the case of C3 and C4. The introduction of RAMAs was indeed an important
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‘card’ in the hands of the cooperatives, but some of the cards the cooperatives needed to achieve
quality management were missing from the pack.
The analysis reported here shows that studies on how cooperatives can meet the increasing
quality challenge should not be limited to governance and management issues at the cooperative
level, which would take the whole supply chain as a given. Future studies should consider the
other members of the supply chain as fully ﬂedged actors, whose strategies can seriously affect
the room for maneuver cooperatives have when drawing up new agreements with their members
for improved quality management.
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